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C I V I L R I G H T S
Mixed Motives: Are City Council Members Absolutely
Immune from Civil Rights Liability for Legislative
Acts Taken for Both Lawful and Unlawful Reasons?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 147-150. © 1997 American Bar Association.
ISSUE
Are individual members of a city
council absolutely immune from
liability under federal civil rights
law for enacting a budget ordinance
that eliminated the plaintiff's job, or
can a court consider the motives
of the elected city officials who
enacted the ordinance and signed
it into law?
FACTS
In 1987, the City of Fall River,
Massachusetts ("Fall River")
enacted an ordinance establishing
the Department of Health and
Human Services ("DHHS" or the
"Department"). Fall River hired
Janet Scott-Harris, the respondent
in this case, as the DHHS adminis-
trator. Scott-Harris was the first
African American to hold a
managerial position in Fall River's
government.
In October 1990, Scott-Harris
charged another Fall River employ-
ee, Dorothy Biltcliffe, with making
racist comments and recommended
Biltcliffe's discharge. In response to
Scott-Harris' charges, Biltcliffe
threatened to use her "influence"
and contacted several people
including City Councilor Marilyn
Roderick, one of the petitioners
here.
Biltcliffe later accepted a 60-day
suspension without pay. When
Daniel Bogan, the second petitioner,
became Fall River's mayor in
December 1990, he reduced
Biltcliffe's suspension.
In 1991, Mayor Bogan requested all
Fall River departments to trim their
fiscal 1992 budgets by 10 percent
from the previous fiscal year
because of an anticipated decline in
state aid for 1992. Scott-Harris com-
plied with this directive and submit-
ted a budget for DHHS that elimi-
nated vacant positions and reduced
nursing services in public schools
and senior centers.
(Continued on Page 148)
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Bogan rejected Scott-Harris' budget
and, instead, proposed eliminating
DHHS, which also would eliminate
Scott-Harris' position. Because the
department had been created by
ordinance, it could be eliminated
only by ordinance. In March 1991,
Bogan asked the City Council to
eliminate DHHS, which it did by
a vote of six to two; Roderick
voted with the majority. Bogan
subsequently signed the ordinance
into law.
Only one reason was given for
adopting Bogan's proposal to scrap
DHHS - the projected shortage of
money. There was no discussion of
the Scott-Harris' charges of racism
against Biltcliffe or any indication
that Scott-Harris' job performance
was unsatisfactory.
At about the same time that the
ordinance eliminating DHHS
became law, Bogan offered Scott-
Harris the position of Public Health
Director at a lower salary. Scott-
Harris drafted a letter rejecting
the job offer but did not send it.
Nevertheless, the draft somehow
was delivered to Bogan who accept-
ed Scott-Harris' rejection of the job
offer despite her efforts to retract it.
These events prompted Scott-Harris
to file a federal civil rights suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)
("Section 1983") against Fall River,
Bogan, Roderick, and other Fall
River officials. Scott-Harris alleged
the municipal and individual defen-
dants had discriminated against her
on the basis of race and had violat-
ed her First Amendment free-speech
rights. Ultimately all defendants
except Bogan and Roderick were
dismissed from the case, and the
case against them proceeded to a
jury trial.
At trial the defendants asserted that
their motive in passing the chal-
lenged ordinance was exclusively
fiscal. Scott-Harris disagreed; she
asserted that racial animus and a
desire to punish her for protected
speech, not budgetary constraints,
had spurred introduction and pas-
sage of the ordinance. She claimed
that Fall River was not anticipating
a cut in state aid but a slight
increase, and that Bogan did not
consider other options for saving
money.
The jury found that there was no
racial discrimination, but found that
punishing Scott-Harris' constitution-
ally protected speech was a
substantial or motivating factor in
Bogan's decision to recommend
eliminating DHHS and in Roderick's
decision to work for passage of the
required ordinance. The jury then
assessed compensatory damages
(see Glossary) in the amount of
$156,000. The jury further assessed
punitive damages (see Glossary)
against Bogan in the amount of
$60,000 and against Roderick in
the amount of $15,000.
The First Circuit affirmed. 36 Fed.
R. Serv. 3d 1150 (1st Cir. 1997).
Recognizing that municipal officials
have absolute immunity from civil
liability for damages arising out of
their performance of legitimate leg-
islative activities, the appeals court
held that the officials here had
engaged in administrative acts, not
legislative acts.
The First Circuit's decision is now
before the Supreme Court, which
granted Bogan and Roderick's joint
petition for a writ of certiorari.
117 S. Ct. 2430 (1997).
CASE ANALYSIS
Bogan and Roderick argue that
municipal legislators performing the
same legislative functions as their
federal, state, and regional counter-
parts should be entitled to absolute
immunity. More precisely, Bogan
and Roderick argue that the
Supreme Court has explicitly dis-
avowed the First Circuit's motive-
based approach to absolute legisla-
tive immunity. In their view, the
First Circuit's infusion of a subjec-
tive element into the absolute-
immunity analysis forces defendants
to defend against factual allegations
and await their resolution - the
very process that absolute legislative
immunity was designed to avoid.
Bogan and Roderick claim that they
are entitled to absolute immunity
because in enacting the budget
ordinance they were performing
traditional legislative functions
regardless of any improper motive.
They explain that budget making,
including the elimination of munici-
pal positions, is the kind of prospec-
tive, policy-based action that is the
hallmark of traditional legislative
functions.
Bogan and Roderick contend further
that the First Circuit's approach to
legislative immunity opens the door
for courts to impose liability on
individual legislators despite enact-
ment of facially neutral legislation.
In their view, the First Circuit's
approach would hinder local legisla-
tors in considering lawful and
proper legislation.
Scott-Harris responds that the doc-
trine of absolute legislative immuni-
ty should not be applied at the local
level. Relying on an analysis of the
history of legislative immunity,
Scott-Harris stresses that members
of local governing bodies did not
Issue No. 3
have absolute immunity at common
law. She explains that unlike mem-
bers of state legislatures, members
of municipal governing bodies could
be held personally liable for their
unlawful conduct if they used their
official positions maliciously or in
bad faith.
Scott-Harris maintains that Bogan
and Roderick are seeking a vast
expansion of immunity from the
nation's civil rights laws. She asserts
that if absolute immunity is granted
to members of city and county gov-
erning bodies, some 342,812 addi-
tional persons will be able to engage
in knowing and deliberate constitu-
tional violations free of liability.
Scott-Harris contends that the pub-
lic policy underlying Section 1983
would be better served by granting
members of local governing bodies
qualified immunity (see Glossary)
rather than absolute immunity. She
says that qualified immunity would
provide sufficient protection for
local government officials.
Scott-Harris also argues that the
possibility of relief against a munici-
pality alone is an inadequate reme-
dy. Observing that punitive damages
serve important purposes, Scott-
Harris points out that municipalities
are immune from punitive damages.
See City of Newport v. Fact
Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 257 (1981).
Even if absolute immunity is avail-
able for the legitimate legislative
acts of local officials, Scott-Harris
contends that the conduct at issue
in this case was not legislative in
nature. According to Scott-Harris,
the ordinance abolishing her job
was not a rule of general application
and, accordingly, cannot be
considered a legislative act.
SIGNIFICANCE
The Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1870,
and 1871, generally known as the
Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts
and including Section 1983, were
enacted to enforce the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments in the
post-Civil War era. Section 1983 is
probably the most important part of
the Reconstruction Civil Rights
Acts. Section 1983 authorizes suits
against any person for the depriva-
tion of rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by federal law if the
defendant acted "under color of
state law, custom or usage," i.e.,
acted as if authorized by state law.
The Supreme Court ruled in Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436
U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978), that
municipalities could be held liable
under Section 1983 for deprivations
of federally protected rights that
occurred "pursuant to official
municipal policy of some nature."
Although local government agencies
do not enjoy immunity from suit
under Section 1983, Leatherman v.
Tarrant County Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163 (1993), ABA PREVIEW
161 (Dec 31, 1992), the Supreme
Court has held that state lawmakers
and regional government officials
have absolute immunity both from
suit and from liability for damages
arising out of their performance of
legitimate legislative activities,
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367
(1951); Lake Country Estates, Inc. v.
Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440
U.S. 391 (1979).
The doctrine of absolute legislative
immunity from civil suit and dam-
ages liability has its roots in the
parliamentary struggles of 16th and
17th century England, and it is
based on the need to protect the
democratic decision-making
process. Absolute legislative immu-
nity avoids the danger that legisla-
tors will be subjected to the cost,
inconvenience, and distractions of a
trial simply for doing their jobs as
legislators. Moreover in Supreme
Court of Virginia v. Consumers
Union of the United States, 446
U.S. 719 (1980), the United States
Supreme Court stated that in order
to preserve legislative indepen-
dence, legislators engaged in legiti-
mate legislative activity should be
protected not only from the conse-
quences of litigation but also from
the burden of defending themselves
in the first place.
That said, it is also the case that
members of local governing bodies
did not have absolute immunity at
common law, at least with respect
to ministerial actions - actions not
involving the use of discretion. See,
e.g., Amy v. Supervisors, 78 U.S.
(11 Wall.) 136 (1871).
The present case plays itself out on
this historical and precedential
stage and is informed by the fact
that it is a case of first impression;
until now, the Court has not consid-
ered whether municipal officials
are protected by the doctrine of
absolute immunity in their legisla-
tive activities. However, since the
Court's decision in Lake Country
Estates, lower federal courts gener-
ally have held that the doctrine of
absolute legislative immunity is
available to local legislators.
See, e.g., Fry v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 7 F.3d 936 (10th Cir.
1993); Acevedo-Cordero v. Cordero-
Santiago, 958 F.2d 20 (1st Cir.
1992); Gross v. Winter, 876 F.2d
165 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
If Bogan and Roderick prevail,
local legislative officials will have
increased protection from civil
rights suits. However, a holding
that such officials are entitled to
absolute immunity would not result
in aggrieved persons' being deprived
of all remedies.
(Continued on Page 150)
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Injured persons usually can sue
the local governmental entity direct-
ly, and willful deprivations of consti-
tutional rights under color of state
law can be punished in criminal
proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 242.
See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409 (1976); United States v.
Lanier, 117 S. Ct. 1219 (1997),
ABA PREVIEW 217 (Dec. 23, 1996).
Finally, legislators are subject to the
responsibility and brake of the elec-
toral process.
If Scott-Harris prevails, individuals
will have increased protection from
local legislative officials who know-
ingly or in bad faith violate federal
civil rights laws. Of course, the
qualified-immunity defense remains
available to protect all local govern-
ment officials, including legislators,
except those who knowingly violate
the law. Because the question of
qualified immunity typically is
resolved well before trial and
usually even before discovery (see
Glossary), the cost to a local govern-
ment official of defending a lawsuit
under the qualified-immunity
standard will not necessarily be
increased beyond what it would
have cost to respond to a suit under
the absolute-immunity doctrine.
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